Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 1/32 1 1 Space and Place At the very outset of his discussion of space, in the first part of Raum und Zeit, a work composed in haste at the end of his life and published posthumously by his students-the 'feather' fell from the author's hand mid-composition (RZ: iv),1 we are told-Anton Marty introduces a number of ways in which 'Raum' (space), and the related term 'Ort' (place) can be used. At least some of these uses are centrally relevant to his exploration. More than that, they set the data for his treatise in a way to be made clear. Marty at once dispenses with two uses; a 'social' use which he concedes may even be primary, whereby 'place' is understood to be an 'inhabited space'; and one which might be expressed in English as ' terminus'-the end of some process or thing (for instance, the ground may be the 'place' for fallen things). He observes that sometimes 'Ort' 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty on Space Perception Clare Mac Cumhaill © The Author(s) 2019 G. Bacigalupo and H. Leblanc (eds.), Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05581-3_6 C. Mac Cumhaill (*) Durham University, Durham, UK e-mail: clare.maccumhaill@dur.ac.uk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 A1 A2 A3 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 2/32 2 C. Mac Cumhaill and 'Raum' are used interchangeably, sometimes synonymously. The example he gives is striking: Der Körper ist an dem Orte" heisst ganz dasselbe wie "er ist in dem Raume. (RZ, §1: 3) There is a like parallel in English. 'an dem Orte' is naturally translated in English as 'at the place'. But while 'at' may be distinguished from 'in' insofar as the former refers to a place idealised as a zero-dimensional topological point and the latter a place idealised as two-dimensional area or a three-dimensional volume (Wesche 1985: 385), we typically tend to think, and say, that things 'in' space, in being in space, are 'at' places. On this intuitive conception, a place is understood to be a spatial region of limited extent, a use of 'place' that Marty also catalogues and which goes hand in hand with the conception of space that I note in closing. For now, I can be brief. Places are countable and 'spaces' may be too. 'Space', however, is often used as a mass noun like sugar or rain; we may speak of there being more or less 'space' (notice, it is less felicitous to say more or less 'place'). In everyday English, we also sometimes speak of there being more or less 'room', a term cognate with the German term 'Raum'. Marty's exploration evidences that his 'Raum' encompasses what we call 'room'-a space for a purpose or a person, a space which is often enclosed. But the English word 'space', and certainly in recent analytic philosophical use, is less embracive. Finally, Marty introduces two analogous uses where 'place' and 'space' overlap. Empty places are those that can be easily passed through and filled, while 'the space of a body' refers to its cubic content or threedimensional extent. Critically, Marty writes that the latter concept ' presupposes a local positivity that is not identical with it [the body]' (RZ, §1: 4). Let us call this the Naive Presupposition-'naïve' since it tallies, I think, with our pre-theoretic ontology of perceptual space. Or so I shall assume. Marty takes it that what exists is the subject of true affirmative judgement-viz. a judgement with the content that 'x is' or, in this case, 'space exists'. Such pronouncements are hardly every day. Less AQ1 AQ2 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 3/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 3 mysteriously, it seems we can truly judge of things that they are 'in space' or 'at a place'-that an acrobat is suspended in mid-air 'over there', say. Marty's project is to uncover the nature of this 'what is'- space-and the spatial relations that, as he argues, it grounds, and he does so by arguing against a series of philosophical fathers, among them Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and his former teacher Brentano, a dialectical strategy that, as Simons (1990: 157) notes is by no means advantageous. In particular, Marty's positive view, which is interpolated with polemic, is motivated mostly negatively. By sifting a number of positive claims from the earlier sections of Raum und Zeit-the section entitled 'vom Raume'-I have a go at setting a Martyan picture of space perception against the backdrop of contemporary philosophy of perception. The paper unfolds as follows. In Sect. 2, I sketch two charges that Marty raises against Kant and Brentano. Both charges are descriptive and conceptual. Kant's descriptive phenomenology is inadequate, Marty urges. 'Form' is in no sense prior to 'matter'. But it follows from this exploration, in ways I will explain, that Brentano's empirical psychology is also inadequate, and this despite its anti-Kantian flavour. From there, I outline Marty's unusual ontology of space (Sect. 3). Marty has it that spatial relations are non-real but existent, causally inert relations that are grounded in space, which is itself non-real but existent. Objects do not inhere in space in the way properties inhere in substances. Rather, there is a primitive non-real relation of 'fulfillment' (Erfüllung) that holds between objects and places in space, which itself subsists.2 In Sect. 4, I consider whether any contemporary philosophy of perception is equipped to make sense of Martyan space perception, and I suggest that the most promising conception is Naïve Realism. I support my proposal by drawing on some limited remarks that Marty makes in a short correspondence with Husserl.3 I then outline a difficulty for this theoretical translation. Naïve Realism is a direct theory of perception which is often cast as relationalist: Perceptions are fundamentally conscious experiences in which the perceiver is directly acquainted with mind-independent worldly objects, events, and, for some, regions of space and intervals of time. Thus, S perceives O, just in case S stands in such a psychological relation of acquaintance. This relation is non-representational, 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 4/32 4 C. Mac Cumhaill primitive, and, typically, is conceived as a relation of perceptual awareness. As we shall see, the worldly objects of one's acquaintance partly, though constitutively, determine conscious character.4 For Marty, however, all relations are non-real. Further, insofar as they are grounded, they are not fundamental. But in this sense, it might be supposed that they ought not to be construed as brute or primitive either. With this in mind, we might wonder in what sense, if any, the perceptual relation that the Naïve Realist envisages might be conceived as non-real and what its real grounds could thereby be. I explore these matters in Sect. 5, before going on to describe a distinctively Martyan form of Naïve Realism, one which preserves the central theoretical tenet that phenomenal character is fundamentally constituted by worldly objects-Call this the Assimilation Thesis-but which regards the apparent relational structure of awareness as derived, for reasons to be made plain. There are two routes to explain the derivation of the structure that the standard Naïve Realist invokes in her talk of a relation of awareness: one is psychological and necessary, the other is artefactual. I make headway in spelling out the latter by bringing Marty into fleeting conversation with another Thomist-G.E.M. Anscombe (Sect. 6). 2 Kant and Brentano-Dimensions of a Critique Marty's Raum und Zeit has two parts; the first dealing with space, of which there are 33 numbered sections, the latter with time. My reconstruction considers only the first part. Of those 33 sections, a substantial number deal with the shortcomings, as Marty sees them, of central canonical figures-most notably, for my purposes, Kant and Brentano. Both of the charges that I see as relevant to my exploration (there are many others), Marty erects primarily on descriptive phenomenological grounds. Let's start with the first objection.5 Kant is correct, says Marty, in maintaining that if anything sensory is given than so is space. For Kant, notoriously, this is since the form of the receptive faculty is such that, necessarily, anything that 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 5/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 5 is phenomenally given is given in space. But Marty wonders whether from this descriptively true claim, Kant's treatment of space as a subjective form of intuition is invited. Marty reads Kant's transformation of Newtonian space into a subjective form of intuition as preserving Newton's insistence on the unity, infinity and independence of space from that which fills it. In Kant's case however, the independence criterion is reconceived in the following way: the form of intuition is 'pure'-a priori and not dependent on quality. Marty questions this from a descriptive phenomenological perspective. It is 'undeniable', he says, that we can only abstract spatiality from quality; when we see colour we see extent, and it is only by abstraction that we can 'abstract' away from the peculiarities of colour and conceive of spatiality as distinct from quality. Further: Immediately and vividly we are only given the presentation of a space filled with quality. (RZ, §4: 8) But, this being so, it is 'factually above all doubt', says Marty, that our intuition of space is not quality-less, or 'pure' in the sense specified above, and nor are we given an infinite space-Marty takes it as just obvious that our spatial vision is finite, and even very limited.6 Again, his point is descriptive, but he augments it with a genetic or causal claim: no purely empty space could affect our senses. This does not show that space is a subjective form of intuition however. It only shows that just as colour cannot be sensed without extent, the converse also holds. Space cannot be intuited without localised quality.7 Prima facie, this might be thought to suggest that Marty must deny that intuited space retains aspects of the Newtonian conception-most modestly, the thought that space is something over and above its contents, or that which fills it. As we will see however, though Marty agrees with Kant that whenever something sensible is given so is space, and while he argues that space cannot be given without quality-deriding, as his friend Carl Stumpf also does, Kant's imaginative 'subtraction argument', something which I leave aside8-he rejects a relationist conception of space, and not only on descriptive phenomenological grounds, but also, 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 6/32 6 C. Mac Cumhaill it seems, on conceptual grounds too. Thus, we find Marty writing in an intriguing footnote: Kant considers the presentation of an 'empty space' as a posteriori. If one understands by this the presentation of an empty space outside the world, this only follows. For the presentation of a world is certainly empirical, and so also is the [presentation] of adjacent space, not filled with bodies, that would have common boundaries with that world, since the adjacent, as such, cannot be presented without what borders it. (RZ, §6: 17, fn. 1)9 It is notable that Marty refers here to the presentation of an empty space, the singularity of which must, in Kantian terms, be a posteriori. This claim is difficult to make sense of, but one suggestion is the following: such a presentation must be a posteriori since an empty space is one that is not filled with body. It is hence not 'empty' in the sense that a mere form of intuition is, viz. contentless, or without sensible matter. If correct, this suggests a further tempting line of thought. C. B. Martin holds that the provision of the limits of the being of presences (things like pens and bicycles) requires the presence of absence outwith those limits-the presence of absence at places where those things are not or empty regions.10 But if so, and if part of the concept of a body is that of a limited whole, then the concept of an empty space in the first sense (viz. not in the sense of a form of intuition) attends, or is part of the structure of, our concept of a body. More explicit is Marty's critique of Brentano, also on conceptual grounds-and here, as Smith puts it, 'Marty seeks a position more commonsensical than that of his master, even at the price of a certain sort of theoretical inelegance' (1990: 129). I detail Marty's 'inelegant' theory in Sect. 3. First, some comments on his divergence from Brentano. Like Marty, Brentano also maintains a form of spatial nativism- namely, the thought that space is given as part of the originary content of experience: it is not a form of intuition, as Kant thought, and nor is form (typically the form of objects) constructed from bundles of sensation, as an empiricist might hold. Rather, colour continua are founded on spatial continua, the spatial extents they 'colour'. Here 'founded' is a technical term that we can gloss simply, for the purposes of this paper, AQ3 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 7/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 7 as one-sided dependence.11 Since colour is founded on spatial continua, we cannot see colour without seeing extent. For most of his life, Brentano maintained that spatial continua are in turn secondary to, or founded on, temporal continua, where this entails a concomitant rejection of spatial absolutism; what is spatial coincides with what is corporeal and only insofar as bodies persist through time can we say that the three-dimensional spatial continuum that they constitute persists also.12 In later writing on space, however, specifically in the Categories, Brentano appears to grant that places are substances which may or may not be filled. For Smith (1990: 128), Brentano makes this shift so as to be able to give an account of what individuates otherwise qualitatively identical things. Thus, '[t]wo dots of identically the same red are individually different only because one is here, and the other there' (Kat, 247, Eng tran., p. 177). But, unsurprisingly, such an individuation condition makes movement impossibly rare; if things are individuated by the places at which they are, no thing can move place and yet be the same.13 Marty rejects both these Brentanian theses, the earlier and the later. Philosophy, he says, has to 'exercise its office by stubbornly and repeatedly, pointing out the questionable, even the impossibility and absurdity of certain conditions' (RZ, §1: 72), words he borrows from Hermann von Lotze, his former dissertation supervisor (an appeal that is striking in the context of his dispute with his other mentor, Brentano). For Marty, that space is nothing but the ordering of bodies is one such absurdity. But so is the thought that movement is something merely, and only relative or, worse, a fiction. I will assume that this rejection is something that Marty thinks follows from the very concept of movement. But this is not all. Recall the Naïve Presupposition has it that we take bodies to be at places of three-dimensional extent, where such places are positivities that we may say are filled-indeed, as we shall see, Marty takes the relation of 'fulfilment' as basic. The relationist about space can only reductively identify such places with respect to other bodies in the web of corporeal bodies that constitute the spatial continuum. But, as such, the place at which an object is, for the spatial relationist, somehow 'external to it'; it is individuated with respect to other bodies in the nexus, something that, for Marty, seems to run counter 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 8/32 8 C. Mac Cumhaill to how things strike us. How so? For if this were the case, he seems to ask, what could be the meaning or essence of what might be called the in-dwelling, or in-space being of a body (Innewohnen oder Im-RaumSein der Körper [RZ, §15: 76])-the very space or place which the Naïve Presupposition presupposes that things in space occupy or fill? Marty characterises the alternative, reductive strategy of his opponent as follows: To say that between this and another body (atom) is an empty space is only a pictorial way of speaking which, by a fiction of inner form of language, puts something positive in the place of something negative. The correct negative form of expression would be that no other body is between bodies X and Y at any distance from them. Similarly, instead of: from a certain place, empty space expands (in the infinite), the facts can be stated more reasonably as: beyond a certain distance, no body is found anymore. (RZ, §18: 88) Marty does not accept this negative thesis. I sketch his positive proposal below. For now, it is worth noting that Brentano appears, if not to revert to his former position at the end of his life, then to equivocate. Only weeks before his death, on 23 February 1917, a year after the publication of Raum und Zeit, Brentano dictated the essay 'What we can learn about space and time from the conflicting errors of philosophers'. Brentano, it seems, wants to reclaim the thesis that empty space is a fiction: It has been said that if a body is to move then there must exist an empty space into which it moves. This is just as compelling as if someone were to say that, if something to change colour, there must already exist a colour which it then takes on. (quoted in Smith 1990: 169) Adding in a footnote: And indeed why not also: if someone is to enter into marriage, then this marriage must already exist beforehand? (ibid.: fn. 3) Marty's name is mentioned six times in this discussion. AQ4 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 9/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 9 3 Marty's Radical Conception We have seen that for Marty space is not a subjective form of intuition. Mind-independent space would exist in the absence of anyone perceiving it (see Johansson, this volume). Nonetheless, when space is perceived, it is given with the sensible. Further, just as one cannot see colour without seeing extent, one cannot see space without seeing sensible bodies. Importantly, however, this does not entail, pace the early Brentano, that space is to be identified with sensible bodies and the relations in which they stand to one another-it does not mean that 'empty space' is a fiction. So, what, then, is Marty's radical alternative? For Marty, empty space, at least on one understanding, is space that is not filled, where space is a positivity, or, more precisely, as I explain below, non-real existent (see also Johansson, this volume). Prima facie this might seem to align with Brentano's later position, but this is not so. For Marty, whatever can be the subject of a true affirmative judgement exists, where what is non-real in addition is non-real insofar as it cannot enter into causal relations. After Smith, let us call those objects that can enter into causal relations, and which Marty designates as 'real', energetic objects. Non-real entities are, by contrast, anergetic objects, among which are included collectives, states of affairs, values and, as we shall see, relations and space. Now, that space is anergetic might tempt one into supposing that it is ideal and subjective. But Marty holds that it cannot be subjective for the nativist reasons he offers in critique of Kant. Yet nor can it be objective only through being identified with real bodies, as the earlier Brentano proposes. This not only runs counter to what I am calling the Naïve Presupposition, but leads too to an unacceptable scepticism, or at least reductionism, about movement. And once space is admitted instead as a substance that individuates property instances, this scepticism only grows. It is this latter Brentanian proposal that Marty's proposal definitively wants to avert. Substances are real for Marty, and they individuate property instances. Since movement is possible however-and here is Marty's common sense in action-space cannot be said to individuate otherwise 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 10/32 10 C. Mac Cumhaill identical things. Space then is not a substance, so defined. Rather it is, says Marty, a subsistent. Subsistents are like substances insofar as they do not 'inhere' in anything, but unlike substances subsistents are non-real. Thus, while property instances (accidents) inhere in substances, objects cannot be said to 'inhere' in space. Rather, Marty takes the relation of objects to space as brute and basic-they are said, again in the line with common parlance, to 'fill' it (we have called this relation 'fulfilment'; Johansson, this volume calls it 'space-filling'; the German term is 'Raumerfüllung'). With this much spelt out, we can finally detail out the nature of spatial relations for Marty. Spatial relations hold between positions in space: As far as location [Ortlichkeit ] by itself is concerned it is uncontroversial that the relations of being outside and of being side by side are grounded local relations that presuppose absolute places as their grounding fundamenta. (RZ, §7: 24)14 Like all relations, spatial relations are themselves non-real. Nonetheless, they are grounded in space, itself an objective non-real existent (see Johansson 1990 for discussion). 4 Marty, Husserl and a Contemporary Translation Let us gather together some claims that have been sketched, and grant that, from the contemporary perspective, a rather exotic picture emerges. – Space is existent; it is the subject of true affirmative judgement. – Its manner of existence is that it subsists; nothing inheres in it. – Space is a positivity. – Space is anergetic. – Space is non-real. – Space is not a quality-less form of intuition. – When something sensible is given so, necessarily, is form.15 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 11/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 11 – Objects fill space, where the relation of objects to space is sui generis-it is one of fulfilment. – Space cannot be intuited without the presentation of something sensible. To make this latter point a little clearer, let us distinguish subsistent space from substantial form. Unlike Brentano and Stumpf, Marty doesn't think that we only perceive substantial form. The relation of substantial form to subsistent space is, recall, one of fulfilment (space-filling), where empty space is subsistent space that is unfilled. Can we assume, therefore and further, that Marty supposes that empty space can be perceived? Two considerations might be offered here. First, Marty's opening exploration appeals directly to empty space. The concept of an empty space is of a region that can be passed through. Such spaces can be subjects of true affirmative judgement. Second, the concept of an empty space is not the concept of a pure form of intuition, but, arguably, the concept of a region that is empty of body. Since, however, Marty denies that space is to be identified with sensible bodies and the relations in which they stand to one another, even while he holds that we cannot perceive space without also perceiving something sensible, it is arguable that he ought to be prepared to grant that we perceive empty space. Why? Since he allows that we perceive space tout court; both filled and unfilled (to wit: empty) spatial regions. I consider this line of thinking attractive, and it guides what follows.16 However, further work is needed to establish Marty's final view on the possibility of our perceiving empty space-a question over which Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl all waver. To this extent while the explorations that follow are Martyan insofar as they are in the spirit of Marty, they might not be wholly to the letter. My task in the remainder of the paper is to consider Martyan space perception, thus understood, in the light of contemporary philosophy of perception. I take this to be a useful exercise since Marty, as I read him, offers a host of conceptual resources that suggest ways of reframing questions about space perception and perceptual experience more generally, in ways I hope to showcase, if only in a schematic way. 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 12/32 12 C. Mac Cumhaill The explorations that follow then are rough. Even so, it strikes me that two lessons already follow from what I have drawn out so far. Setting these out helps frame the course of the rest of the paper. First, for Marty, space is a non-real existent, not a subjective form of intuition. This being so, it might be thought that any philosophy of perception that endorses the thought that space itself is a subjective form of intuition-rather than something that can be presented under a subjective or ideal mode of presentation say-is non-Martyan.17 Second, since space is non-real on this Martyan picture, it is anergetic. Hence any philosophy of perception which necessitates a causal theory of perception, even where this is treated counterfactually, or one whereby our receptivity extends only to sensible matter, is also at odds with Marty. These two lessons touch on Marty's anti-Kantian misgivings on the one hand, and his anti-Brentanian considerations on the other. Space is not ideal (anti-Kantian), and nor can it be identified with corporeal, substantial bodies (anti-Brentanian). On the assumption that space can be an object of experience, however, rather than a subjective form of intuition, and on the assumption that space is something anergetic that exists in addition to the objects it fills, a question is suggested. What philosophical theory of perception could embrace a Martyan space perception, this much assumed? Begin with orthodoxy. Many forms of standard representationalism, where this is taken to be a thesis concerning the fundamental nature of experience, should run into difficulty on the second count-viz. where the anergetic nature of space is acknowledged. This is since veridical experience is typically taken to be experience that has been caused in the right way, where here the appeal is to experiential states and their causes. In addition, externalists emphasise a history of causal interaction with properties or kinds represented. But this being so, the inefficaciousness of space should make problematic the individuation of certain aspects of spatial content.18 These twin difficulties suggest to me that we should leave representationalism aside, and I do so for the most part of the remainder paper. But the standard palette of philosophical theories of perception is more colourful-it includes forms of relationism, as well as adverbialism. In 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 13/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 13 what follows, I will suggest that it is plausible to think that Martyan perception embraces some form of Naïve Realist relational theory; how we should characterise this is something I turn to in the next section. Before that however, it is worth querying whether the kind of structure of experience that the sense-datum theorist envisages, also a relationist of sorts, could plausibly apply to experience of space, including, critically, experience of empty regions. For the purposes of this paper, I will treat the philosophical concept of a sense-datum functionally. Call a sense-datum whatever it is that we are immediately aware of in experience, in virtue of which, in non-hallucinatory perception, we are mediately aware of worldly objects and their properties.19 Assume, here, that experience has an act/object structure and, further, that demonstrative reference to worldly objects is secured in virtue of the experience of or sensing of sense data. After H. H. Price, call the relation between the sense-datum and that which is indirectly or mediately perceived in virtue of the sensing of the sense-datum 'belonging'. Take it that belonging is a non-causal relation.20 Now, supposing that sense-datum 'belongs to' the worldly object sensed in virtue of the sensing of it (the sense-datum), we might ask: Could there be a space-presenting sense-datum in virtue of which nonreal objective space is perceived and could be demonstrated? If my reading of Marty is on the right track, the relevant sense-datum could not be ideal or subjective, though it could plausibly be private (cf. Johansson 2018). Importantly, however, it cannot be entirely insensible. The notion of an insensible sense-datum is hardly a happy one, but, as we have seen, Marty anyway insists that space cannot be perceived in the absence of the perception of some local quality. Yet even if this much is granted we might wonder: How could a space-presenting sensedatum belong to its object? Belonging is perhaps no more mysterious in the case of space perception than it is in the case of objects. Still, from the functional perspective we have adopted above, belonging, whatever its nature, must allow for the kind of cleavage on which arguments from conflicting appearances to the existence of sense-data spin. That is, belonging ought to be consistent with the putative immediate objects of experience having properties that, as we may say, 'conflict' with the properties of the 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 14/32 14 C. Mac Cumhaill worldly items mediately perceived in virtue of the sensing of sense data. Thus, we want to allow that an elliptical sense-datum can 'belong' to a circular coin. It is not clear that Marty would be willing to admit such disparity or conflict between entities that can be said to putatively 'belong' together. Why so? As Smith (1990: 137) explains 'consciousness, for Marty, is itself just a variety of assimilation of mental processes to (real or nonreal) objects in the world'. He likens Marty's position to that given by Aristotle in De anima, quoting the following passages: What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end of the process the one acted upon has become assimilated to the other. (De anima, 418 a 2ff.) Within the soul the faculties of cognition and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. These faculties, then, must be identical either with the things themselves, or with their forms. Now they are not identical with the objects; for the stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone. (De anima, 431 b 26ff.) Commenting on the parity, Smith writes: Similarly, now, for Marty, all psychic activity is a process which has as its consequence that the psychic activity comes into a certain sui generis sort of conformity with something other than itself. (Ibid.) Smith's exegesis makes it plausible to suggest that the metaphors of 'conformity' and 'assimilation' are more aptly applied to Martyan perception than the metaphor of 'belonging', where conflict or non-conformity is even implied or permitted. But, if so, then this suggests that Marty's position is quite different from those versions of sense-datum theory that lend themselves to being characterised functionally in the way I have above. Instead, it seems closer to a distinct form of relationism: Naïve Realism. This is (in part) the view that: 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 15/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 15 [T]he objects we are consciously acquainted with in perceptual experience are constitutive of conscious character: the aspects of the world that we are acquainted with in perceptual experience constitutively 'shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience' (Martin 2004: 64). Perceptual experiences have the characters they have because of, or in virtue of, the nature and character of the mind-independent objects they involve. (French, forthcoming) Beck (2018) notes a list of adherents: Brewer (2011: 100), Campbell (2002: 116), Fish (2009: 49–50), French (2014: 395–396), Logue (2012, p. 212), Martin (1998, pp. 173–175) and other naive realists all hold that the items a subject perceives in having a perception constitutively shape the perception's phenomenology. There are, I propose, two features of this understanding of Naïve Realism as a thesis about perceptual phenomenology that bring us closer to a Martyan space perception (for further discussion see Beck [2018]). First, on Naïve Realism conceptual space may be made for anergetic objects. This is since there is no requirement that the aspects of the world that shape the contours of consciousness be real or energetic. Thus, arguably shadows can shape the contours of consciousness. Second, it appears that insofar as worldly objects 'shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience', conscious experience can be understood to 'assimilate' its objects, where here assimilation means the 'taking in', or 'picking up', or as Naïve Realists sometimes put it, the involvement of objects in experience. Call the Assimilation Thesis the central theoretical Naïve Realist tenet that the aspects of the world that we are acquainted with in perceptual experience constitutively shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience. Strictly speaking, we can make sense of involvement without Assimilation and a theorist may be committed to the former but not the latter; the metaphysical structure of experience is such that it just ensures that objects are involved. Nonetheless, if we read Naïve Realism as a thesis about not only the nature of experience but the nature of conscious character too, and if it 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 16/32 16 C. Mac Cumhaill is granted that Assimilation entails involvement, then it is fair to pit the Assimilation Thesis as a central tenet. Now, there is reason to think that the theoretical puzzle that I used to partly frame this chapter can be dissolved on such a Naïve Realism. I asked: If space can be an object of experience rather than a subjective form of intuition, and if it is something anergetic that exists in addition to the objects it fills, what philosophical theory of perception could embrace a Martyan space perception? Naïve Realism is a contender since on Naïve Realism it can be granted that non-efficacious entities, including empty regions, can shape the contours of consciousness, such that the phenomenal character of experience is fundamentally constituted by those entities and regions, recognising, as Marty does, that we cannot perceive space in the absence of the perception of local quality. Necessarily, when we see empty regions we see sensible objects. Both are, to borrow a term from Husserl, co-seen.21 This congruence notwithstanding, however, the theoretical translation is not seamless. Let us explore why. For most Naïve Realists, the Assimilation Thesis goes hand in hand with a further doctrine. Cast neutrally, this is the idea that perceiving involves the obtaining of a perceptual relation whereby the perceiving subject 'stands' in a perceptual relation to mind-independent worldly objects. For most Naïve Realists, it is in virtue of the perceiver standing in a perceptual relation to mind-independent worldly objects that those objects can play their character constituting role-to wit, by shaping the contours of consciousness. Different theorists have different ways of articulating this idea. Some speak of a relation of 'conscious acquaintance'; others refer to the obtaining of a 'psychological relation of acquaintance'-both technical notions. Sometimes 'conscious attention' is appealed to, but very often the perceptual relation is spelt out as a relation of awareness. For instance, Soteriou (2013) writes (commenting on a passage from Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism'): Sensory experience somehow involves some kind of psychological relation of awareness, and not simply some psychological event, process, state, or property. In this context, to say that the relation of awareness is a psychological one isn't simply to say that one of the relata of the relation is a psychological subject-a bearer of psychological properties-for there are 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 17/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 17 also non-psychological relations that psychological subjects can stand in to things. The suggestion appears to be that when one has a sensory experience there obtains a distinctive psychological relation that one stands in to some sensory quality, where that sensory quality is not a quality of the psychological relation. The awareness of blue is not itself blue. (Soteriou 2013: 13) Importantly, for many theorists, this relation is primitive. Now, there is reason to think that Marty would partly concur with this picture. In a letter to Husserl, written in 1901 from a 'well-wooded and charming area of the Bohemian Mittelgebirge', he iterates the following two points, responding to objections from Husserl22: 1. You [Husserl] argue: if an act is a relation to an object and if the object, as is normally the case, is transcendent, then on my view it would follow that the transcendent object exists necessarily. Thus, this view (that if a presenting exists then a presented something exists too) cannot be correct. But what does transcendent object mean? Doubtless an object that does not exist merely in consciousness. But a presented something exists. Whether this something exists outside consciousness has nothing to do with the presentation as such [...] 2. Now another of your objections seems to be: according to me the object of a presentation of blue would not be 'blue' but 'presented blue'. But the object presented in a presentation is in fact 'the same object that is judged about in the corresponding judgment and loved in the corresponding state of love'. This object is just blue not the presented blue. I entirely agree with this assertion of yours. The object of the presentation of blue is: blue, not: presented blue". I suggest that 2 might be recruited against reading Marty's position along sense-datum lines-after all, it is 'the same object that is judged about in the corresponding judgement and loved in the corresponding state of love'. While 1 can be read as gesturing at the Assimilation Thesis and an associated relationism. This is so at least in the following sense. For the Naïve Realist, in order that worldly objects can play a character constituting, consciousness-shaping role, the perceptual relation must obtain. In such cases, the perceptual relation obtaining entails that those 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 18/32 18 C. Mac Cumhaill objects that partly shape phenomenal character exist, but not that they exist necessarily. I pick up the further matter of 'presenting' below. For all that, however, there are significant differences between Marty's position and the Naïve Realism I have articulated above. These can be brought into view by sketching a challenge for the Naïve Realist attracted by Marty's unusual take on space. For the Naïve Realist, perception involves a primitive perceptual relation. But for Marty all relations, and not only spatial relations, are unreal. If there is such a perceptual relation then, it is a non-real relation. What kind of Naïve Realism can be developed, starting from this assumption? I make some tentative suggestions in the next section. 5 Space for Naïve Realism? To begin, on a Martyan Naïve Realism, the perceptual relation ought not to be conceived as primitive in the sense of brute or unanalysable. The relation is non-real, as all relations are. Further, it is grounded. In Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Marty writes that 'the peculiar relationship of consciousness to its object' is a special kind of grounded relation (quoted in Johansson 1990: 191). Johansson reads Marty as supposing that nonreal relations can be grounded in non-real entities like space and time, as well as in real entities. Start by considering only real worldly relata of the putative perceptual relation-for instance, a cherry tree. All Naïve Realists teach that when a perceiver sees something, a particular cherry tree say, she stands in a perceptual relation to that thing, where standing in this relation explains why the cherry tree, in this case, can play a consciousness-shaping role. It should be plain by now, I hope, that merely being a psychological subject isn't sufficient to field the subject-end of the relation since such a subject can stand in manifold non-psychological relations to things-as when asleep and the cheery tree is outside the window. Rather, the relevant relatum must be a psychological subject in a certain conscious state or in whom certain conscious occurrences are unfolding.23 I suggest that Marty assumes this much with the concept of 'presenting': 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 19/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 19 Presenting [...] is a real process in the mind. In case there exists that which one calls the presented, then as a non-real consequence of the process it follows that the presenting mind stands to this thing in a peculiar relation, which might be described as an ideal similarity or adequacy. (U: 406, quoted in Smith 1990: 125) And when 'presenting' occurs Marty writes: What really exists within us is not a peculiar, modified double of the real object, but only the real psychic process to which in certain circumstances there becomes attached as consequence an ideal similarity with something other, existing independently of this process. (ibid.: 415f., quoted in Smith, ibid.) Importantly, on this view then, to say that the experience 'has an object'-the presented-is not to suppose that the presented is a ' double', some kind of sensory image of the real object say. For in circumstances where 'there exists that which one calls the presented', the object that the experience has, is the object that exists independently of the presenting-to wit, the worldly object. Accordingly, the experience 'has an object' necessarily in the sense that the present existence of the object is a requirement on the existence of process that is the presenting of an existing object.24 Support for this reading comes, I think, from a distinction that Marty makes between the relations of correlation and relative determination. The relation of correlation entails the coexistence of its relata (Mulligan 1990: 19)-though, as we have seen, in the perceptual case, the subject-end of the relatum cannot simply be a psychological subject, but one for whom there is a presenting of an existing object, a presenting which thus has an existent object necessarily but which does not in turn necessitate the existence of its object. But experiences can also 'have an object' in a different sense (see Egidi 1990 for discussion). Experiences are often said to 'have an object' insofar as they are typically taken to be intentional. Insofar as experiences are taken to be intentional however, they may also seem to involve a relational structure, at least insofar as they are said to be objects of AQ5 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 20/32 20 C. Mac Cumhaill mental states of various sorts. It is notable that for Brentano this apparent relational structure is only apparently relational; in fact, it involves a 'complex of presentations' which involves instead 'relative determinations' (Smith 1990: 126), where the complexity of the relevant presentations is relative in the following sense. Brentano supposes that where one thing is thought of (or experienced) relative to another, that which is thought of or experienced directly is said to be thought of or experienced 'in modo recto ', while that which is thought of or experienced relative to what is thought of or experienced directly, is thought of or experienced 'in modo obliquo '-viz. relative to that which is thought of in the direct mode. Importantly, in cases of relative determination that which is thought of or experienced in modo recto must exist, if that which is relative is to exist. But that which is presented in modo obliquo need not exist (except in certain cases). But as such, on this understanding, an experience can have an object in the second sense (the intentional sense), while not having an object in the first sense (the transcendent sense). Chisholm (1990: 2) details Brentano's application of this distinction to sensation in a 1914 manuscript: [Brentano] makes two remarkable statements. The first is: 'In sensing I am the sole object that is presented in recto [das einzige in recto vorgestellte Objekt] '. The second is: 'The thing that we have as external object is sensed only in obliquo.... It is sensed as sensed by us'. As we have seen however, Marty appears to insist that presenting of an existent object involves correlation-the necessary coexistence of its relata. As such, this demands the existence of the object of experience in the first, transcendent sense, and not merely as a relative determination within a complex presentation. Now, it might be objected that the obtaining of a relation of correlation is consistent with contemporary forms of representationalism that likewise deny the existence of an internal 'double' of the real object- I am thinking here of what Fish designates as 'strong' versions of representationalism (2010: 67)-and insofar as Marty often speaks of correlation in terms of 'adequation' or 'correctness' this reading might seem supported. Once it is recalled, however, that Marty seems to hold that 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 21/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 21 space, as a non-real objective entity, is a possible object of experience in the first sense, it is, I think, possible to resist this interpretation. Why? Space is anergetic. There is then a question for the representationalist as to how space can 'get into experience'-viz. be represented-without itself having any causal impact on the subject.25 One promising strategy, surely, is to appeal, simply, to relations between things and to represent those relations. But it not clear that Marty would find the mere representation of spatial relations between things satisfactory. This is because he seems to think that the spatial relations are themselves also presented to us in experience (bearing in mind, recall, that these are grounded in space). He writes: We find them [spatial relations] there before us, and if this were not so, if they were a product of our psychic activity, then how would things stand with regard to the objectivity of our entire knowledge of nature [...]? (U: 468, quoted in Smith 1990: 126) However, it is plausible to think that, for the representationalist, spatial relations are precisely not 'there before us' but are only represented as ways things are arrayed or stand relative to each other and the perceiver. But, as such, spatial relations cannot be presented in experience directly and nor is there any possibility of their playing a character-shaping role. This former point is in essence the criticism that Marty wages against Brentano's reduction of non-real spatial relations to relative determinations in complex (intentional) presentations (see Egidi 1990 for discussion). Johansson (2014) suggests a way of transposing this objection to the contemporary scene, formulating Naïve Realism as the conjunction of the following four broad theses: (a) the perceiving subject and the perceived object are two distinct entities where none is part of the other26; (b) there is a distance between the subject and the object, but the subject and the object are nonetheless in some sense connected; (c) the distance between the subject and the object is empty; (d) there is a relation of directedness (the arrow) from the subject to the object. 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 22/32 22 C. Mac Cumhaill He notes: The term 'distance' adds something important to the view that, necessarily, consciousness is consciousness of something. The conjunction of the statements (a) and (d) says that perception is always perception of something, but it does not bring in any notion of distance; this is done in (b) and (c). (RZ, 3) But, for a Brentanian, arguably, (b) and (c) are subsumed into (a) and (d) inasmuch as the ofness (a) and directedness (d) of intentional experience might be supposed sufficient to capture the phenomenology that (b) and (c) articulates. For the contemporary representationalist in addition, experience might be said to be 'of ' or about distance-the empty distance between the subject and object say. Such regions must be represented. But for Marty, who resists the ideality or subjectivity of space as a form of intuition, insisting too that space is anergetic, such regions are, and are presented as being, there, before us.27 Now, so far, I have suggested reasons for thinking that the Martyan position I am constructing should be found sympathetic to contemporary Naïve Realism, specifically insofar as it seems to endorse a correlational account of the relation which requires the existence of, and is dependent on, the worldly consciousness-shaping objects that such experiences thereby have. On this understanding, perceptual correlation involves Assimilation. As noted, correlation is a non-real relation. Earlier, however, I noted that most Naïve Realists characterise the perceptual relation as one of awareness. I now want to suggest that this spells trouble for the attempt at a theoretical transposition. 6 Awareness Versus Correlation To begin, we ought to grant that perceptual awareness requires more than perceptual correlation. It requires relative determination insofar as it requires that the experience or episode of perceptual awareness have an object in both senses detailed above. Second, perceptual awareness is typically understood as reflexive in the sense best characterised by quoting directly from Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism': 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 23/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 23 To be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image - of a 'thing', of which 'blue' and some other element are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the same sense. (Moore 1903: 25) That perceptual awareness involves awareness of awareness explains why sensory experience, so understood, can be meaningfully cast as a kind of knowing, as the Naïve Realist often insists-this follows from the claim that experience is direct acquaintance with mind-independent worldly things and events, etc. But that awareness could be a kind of knowing is also, one would think, explained by the fact that genuine perception involves what Marty calls correlation: it involves the presentation of an existent object.28 Now, although perceptual awareness requires more than perceptual correlation insofar as the former but not the latter is conceived to have an object in the second sense as well as the first, and insofar as the latter, but not necessarily the former, involves reflexive awareness, it is also the case that many Naïve Realists deny that we are aware of anything in hallucination. This might seem to tally with Marty since although perceptual awareness requires more than correlation, correlation demands the coexistence of its relata. If this requirement were 'inherited' by awareness then, it would follow that in the absence of the existence of the object apparently presented, as in hallucination, there could be no awareness. Marty, I suspect, would say differently. On the Martyan picture I am sketching, in hallucination, there may be relative determination without correlation. Cast differently, the hallucinatory experience does not 'have an object' in the first, transcendent sense, but it does in the second, intentional sense. It is worth harnessing G. E. M. Anscombe's criticism of the Ordinary Language philosopher in her difficult paper 'The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature' to make sense of this. In saying that Marty seems to allow that hallucination involves the presenting of a non-existent object, it might be thought that the use of 'object' deployed here is that which is also admitted by the sense-datum theorist or Meinongian when they wish to preserve the intuition that in AQ6 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 24/32 24 C. Mac Cumhaill such cases (or in thinking of entities like unicorns say) we are aware of, in experience (or in our thinking of ), some thing. But Marty does not seem to have this particular understanding of 'object' in mind, at least in the case of hallucination. This is because he seems to think that in these cases the meaning of 'object' is transferred from cases where predicates are applied to real objects; there is a kind of linguistic Bild, or fiction of inner linguistic form, as though: one were to allow the person portrayed to inhabit the portrait because of the similarity between the contours and colours of the painted bit of canvas and those of the portrayed body or face. (RZ, §12: 58) This recalls G. E. M. Anscombe's critique of both the Ordinary Language philosopher and the sense-datum theorist. Both theorists offer an ontological response to the question 'what do you see?' That is, they respond by giving the name of entities, things-everyday objects or, alternatively, sense data-as things seen. But while the Ordinary Language theorist denies that we see anything in hallucination-since what we see are ordinary things-the sense data insists that we see some thing, some data of sense! In contrast, Anscombe recommends a grammatical approach. The objects of sensation are not things, in the weighty ontological sense but direct objects of the sensation verb. Thus, we can intelligibly say that we see things even in cases where it is evident to all, including the speaker, that no such thing exists in the perceiver's vicinity. How does this shift from ontology to grammar help the Martyan theorist, who is nonetheless tempted by Naïve Realism with respect to the nature of phenomenal character? Notice that when the Naïve Realist denies, as she typically does, that in hallucinatory experience we are aware of anything, in doing so, she preserves the sense of 'thing' that applies in the good, non-hallucinatory case-this is precisely why she denies that we are aware of anything in the hallucinatory case. It strikes me, however, that a Martyan Naïve Realist should want to urge that genuine perception involves correlation and that this is what grounds phenomenal character, but without deploying what is ostensibly a linguistic picture to articulate the metaphysical structure of experience (and which may in turn lead one to 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 25/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 25 insist that in hallucinatory experience we cannot say that something is seen). To clarify: sensation verbs take direct objects. The verb 'to be aware' though not a sensation verb strictly speaking also takes a grammatical object. The Naïve Realist, in noting that in hallucination, by definition, there is nothing in the world that answers the subject's description of what they 'see', and in supposing that phenomenal character is partly constituted by the worldly objects of which the perceiver is putatively aware, may be tempted to suppose both that nothing is seen-i.e. the subject is mistaken in her use of that term, that she is not thereby aware of anything-and, further, that the experience thereby lacks phenomenal character. The Martyan picture is more circumspect. It says only that hallucination involves the presenting of a non-existent object. But, if I am right, Marty does not want to read the notion of object here-an intentional notion-ontologically. Scholarly work is required to establish the scope and correctness of this claim. 7 'Raum' and Room To conclude, I want to sketch briefly two positive lessons that fall out of my attempt to provide for a Martyan Naïve Realism. At the outset I noted what I called the Naïve Presupposition, which is just the perceptual datum that we do not take the spaces that bodies fill to be identical with them; and this is partly why it makes sense to say that things appear to be located at places. The Assimilation Thesis, recall, is the idea that perceptual conscious is fundamentally shaped by (or constituted by) worldly objects. We might not ask: Are these two conceptually or theoretically related? I think it is plain that they are not conceptually related. Nonetheless, if the generic characterisation I have given of Naïve Realism above is accurate, they are, at least, theoretically related. How so? For those theorists who think the perceptual relation is a relation of awareness, and where the possibility of Assimilation is explained by the subject's standing in such a relation of awareness to the objects 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 26/32 26 C. Mac Cumhaill of her experience, there may be a tendency to think that the Naïve Presupposition is likewise assured. Why so? Awareness is a non-solipsistic relation. P. F. Strawson famously proposed that a requirement on non-solipsistic consciousness is that a subject be able to conceive of things existing in the absence of her experience of them where this requires a conception of space. If having a conception of space is partially what grounds the phenomenology that the Naïve Presupposition is supposed to capture however, and where the possibility of awareness is secured when there is such a conception, awareness being non-solipsistic, then the Assimilation Thesis and the Naïve Presupposition should go hand in hand. If we take Naïve Realism to be a thesis, only, about the fundamental nature of phenomenal character however, a weaker form of relationism may suffice. What form this may take, I leave for some other occasion, suffice to say that unyoking the Naïve Presupposition from the Assimilation Thesis opens up explanatory paths not much explored in contemporary analytic philosophy of perception. This is one reason for taking seriously Marty's peculiar take on space-one which, as I understand it, is nonetheless supposed to honour perceptual and linguistic data. Another is the following: I began this paper by detailing a variety of ways in which the words 'place' and 'space' can be used. I noted Marty's inclusion in this list of the English word 'room', completely untheorised in contemporary analytic philosophy of perception-for various reasons, not unconnected with the point above, 'room' just vanishes from contemporary analytic theorising (the Brentanian school is thereby an informative counterpoint). Johansson, this volume, explains in what sense the concept of 'a room' helps isolate Marty's conception of 'Raum ', with which it overlaps: A room is regarded neither as some kind of relations between the things in it, nor as a contingent structure inhering in the properties of the things there. Also, rooms can always easily be thought of as being completely empty, as three-dimensional holes so to speak; and some of them are also so perceived. Such a room is homogenous in the sense that all its different parts are regarded as exactly similar in their emptiness. (This volume, p. x) 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 27/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 27 This gloss is illuminating. Empty rooms can be perceived-the empty space they enclose is co-seen with the walls which 'line' the room (recall, for Marty, we cannot see space without seeing localised quality). But there are a host of other uses that are relevant to the concept of space that contemporary analytic philosophers have almost wholly ignored. In English, 'room' can sometimes mean dimensional extent-the amount of space that is or may be taken up by a thing, event or process. In such cases, there may be 'more' or less 'room'. Sometimes 'room' refers not to some dimensional extent but the capacity to accommodate a person or thing or to allow a particular kind of action; 'room' in this sense appears with modifying words such as 'ample', 'enough', 'plenty of '; sometimes there can be 'no room'. Marty takes it that spatial relations are there: 'We find them there before us'. Space is not a nexus of spatial relations between real things on this view, a conception of which is a condition on the possibility of awareness and so, on certain views, experience. Nor are experienced spatial relations determined relative to ourselves, where we are experienced in modo recto, and everything else in the oblique mode. Rather, on a Martyan understanding, as I have been telling it, there are existent ways in which our world is shaped, ways which in turn shape our consciousness. Anscombe famously thought that no action could fail to have moral significance-even the plucking of a single flower. Assuming perceiving involves perceptual activity, it is hardly plausible that this demanding and austere thought could apply to Raum qua 'space'. Yet although, as Johansson urges, Raum is homogeneous in its emptiness, 'room' in some of the above senses, which is also there-room for a person, or for an event-is not. And this suggests, at least to me, an unexplored place for the theorist of perception to retreat to, and 'dwell in' with her theories. Notes 1. Page numbers refer to the original edition text. 2. For discussion, see Johansson, this volume, as well as Johansson (1990), Rosaria Egidi (1990), and Barry Smith (1990). 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 28/32 28 C. Mac Cumhaill 3. Trans. Mulligan and Schuhmann, K. in Mulligan (1990: 225–236). 4. Though intentional theories are sometimes presented as relational- experience involves an intentional relation to sensible properties (that may or may not be instantiated)-I leave explicit consideration of this construal aside. See, for example, Pautz (2010). 5. Marty's work is untranslated. The exposition that follows is far from scholarly. I have been helped in my comprehension by the work of Chisholm, Johansson, Mulligan, Simons, Smith, and, particularly, Egidi in the 1990 volume 'Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics', edited by Kevin Mulligan. Hélène Leblanc and Mark Textor helped me with the translation of some puzzling passages. Special thanks to Craig French and Ingvar Johansson for insightful comments on an earlier draft. 6. He supplements this point with an interesting and early discussion of modality-specific spatial fields, which I leave aside. 7. Husserl is more explicit on this point in his 1907 Thing and Space lectures: 'It must be noted, however, that a given empty space is necessarily an empty space between given things or phantom of things. If nothing spatial at all is given, then neither is any space' (Husserl 1997/1973: 323, fn. 1). 8. See instead Mac Cumhaill (in preparation). 9. Thanks to Mark Textor and Hélène Leblanc for suggestions as to how to translate this passage. 10. See C. B. Martin (2006). 11. See O. Massin (forthcoming) for a discussion of the conception of 'founded' relations. 12. See Barry Smith (1988) for discussion of Brentano's notion of a continuum, and the distinction, and relations, between spatial and temporal continua. 13. Ingvar Johansson rightly points that if things are partly individuated with respect to places, there is no problem with movement. 14. This translation appears in Johansson (1990: 153). Johansson notes that this characterisation leads to a peculiar consequence: there must be at least two different kinds of grounded relations-those grounded in something real (e.g. colour resemblance and difference of weight) and those grounded in something non-real (e.g. spatial relations). 15. We can now see perhaps why Marty mostly favours the term 'ausgebreitet' (spread out) to characterise the relation of sensible matter to form, over 'durchdringend' (interpenetrated), used by Stumpf. 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 29/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 29 16. See, however discussion at §§17–18. 17. Johansson (2018) argues that space is objective in Marty's sense, but that the space of perceptual experience is nonetheless subjective. Since a careful elaboration of Johansson's subtle and distinctive position requires the introduction of a number of concepts that are peculiar to Johansson (for instance the notion of intentional-logical distance), I treat his view directly and in detail elsewhere. 18. Prima facie, Chalmers recent development of spatial functionalism (Chalmers 2006, 2012, forthcoming), a species of phenomenology-first representationalism where veridical space perception involves a Fregean manner of presentation, might seem to escape this difficulty. I leave the reader to follow this position up. I would suggest however that Fregean representationalism is also at odds with Marty's picture, albeit for another reason: it makes visible space essentially ideal. 19. I recognise that this functional treatment may be viewed as inadequate in a number of respects. It defines sense-data in terms of non-hallucinatory experience rather than, as is more common, by appealing to historical responses to the argument for hallucination and illusion (see Fish 2010 for discussion). I do this for dialectical reasons. Second, my formulation may prompt epistemic worries-for instance, it might be thought that whether or not an entity is a sense datum cannot be determined until it is known whether experience is non-hallucinatory. I don't think this is a difficulty for a functional treatment for the kinds of reasons spelt out in Martin (2004). Further, it does not strike me that saying that a sense-datum is whatever one is aware of in non-hallucinatory perception in virtue of which objects (say) are indirectly sensed, does not preclude the further claim that hallucination involves entities of the same kind but in virtue of which nothing is sensed. Thanks to Ingvar Johansson for raising these worries. 20. For discussion, H. H. Price (1932). 21. See fn. 7. 22. Translated by K. Mulligan and K. Schuhmann (1990). 23. It is plausible to think that, for the world to play a consciousness-shaping role, the subject must be awake. Merely being awake isn't sufficient for perception however-one could be awake in a sensory-deprivation tank. 24. To be clear: both according to Marty and Brentano, a presenting may be a presenting of an existing or non-existing object. But according to AQ7 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 30/32 30 C. Mac Cumhaill Marty, only the presenting of an existing object really has an object. This constitutes a difference between Brentano and the late Marty: Brentano maintained that even the presenting of a non-existing object has in a sense an object. Thanks to Giuliano Bacigalupo for emphasising this point. 25. I leave aside the question as to how space could be phenomenally represented. 26. An important though not unproblematic exception is of course when we perceive 'ourselves'. 27. Johansson distinguishes between material-logical and intentionallogical distance, an important and productive distinction that I discuss in Mac Cumhaill (in progress). 28. Cf. Johansson (2014, Section 4). References Beck, O. 2018. Rethinking Naïve Realism. Philosophical Studies (Online First). Brentano, F. 1988. Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum, trans. B. Smith. Oxford: Routledge. Brewer, B. 2011. Perception and Its Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. 2006. Perception and the Fall from Eden. In Perceptual Experience, ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 49–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. 2012. Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. Forthcoming. Three Puzzles About Spatial Experience. In Themes from Ned Block, ed. A. Pautz and D. Stoljar. Cambridge: MIT Press. Chisholm, R. 1990. Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis Suggested by Brentano. Ed. K. Mulligan, 1–11. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Egidi, R. 1990. Marty's Theory Space. Ed. K. Mulligan, 171–179. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fish, W. 2010. Introduction to Philosophy of Perception. London: Routledge. AQ8 AQ9 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 31/32 6 Raum and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty ... 31 French, C. 2014. Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. Ratio 27: 393–413. French, C. Forthcoming. Naïve Realism and Diaphaneity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2): 149–175. Husserl, E. 1997/1973. Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Johansson, I. 1990. Marty on Grounded Relations. Ed. K. Mulligan, 151–157. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Johansson, I. 2014. Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and AntiRepresentationalism. Metaphysica 15: 239–265. Johansson, I. 2018. Perceptual Spaces Are Sense-Modality-Neutral. Open Philosophy 2 (1): 14–39. Logue, H. 2012. Why Naive Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112: 211–237. Mac Cumhaill, C. In Progress. Co-Seeing and Seeing-Through. Martin, C.B. 2006. How It Is: Entities, Absences and Voids. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1): 57–65. Martin, M.G.F. 1998. Setting Things Before the Mind. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43: 157–179. Martin, M.G.F. 2004. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120: 37–89. Marty, A. 1908. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Bd. 1. Halle: Niemeyer (Referred to in the text as U). Marty, A. 1916. Raum und Zeit. Aus dem Nachlass des Verfassers herausgegeben von J. Eisenmeier, A. Kastil und O. Kraus. Halle: Niemeyer (Referred to in the text as RZ). Massin, O. Forthcoming. 'Brentanian Continua'. Brentano Studien. Moore, G.E. 1903. The Refutation of Idealism. In Philosophical Papers, 1–30. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co Inc. Mulligan, K. 1990a. Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Mulligan, K. (ed.). 1990b. Marty's Philosophical Grammar, 11–29. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Mulligan, K., and K. Schuhmann. 1990. Two Letters from Marty to Husserl by Kevin Mulligan and Karl Schuhmann. Ed. K. Mulligan, 225–237. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Pautz, A. 2010. A Simple View of Consciousness. In The Waning of Materialism, ed. G. Bealer and R. Koons, 25–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press. AQ10 AQ11 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 A u th o r P ro o f Layout: Pop_A5 Book ID: 461216_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-030-05581-3 Chapter No.: 6 Date: 30 November 2018 20:52 Page: 32/32 32 C. Mac Cumhaill Price, H.H. 1932. Perception. London: Metheun & Co. Simons, P. 1990. Marty on Time. Ed. K. Mulligan, 157–169. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Smith, B. 1990. Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth. Ed. K. Mulligan, 111–143. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Soteriou, M. 2013. The Mind's Construction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, P.F. 1959/1961. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Metheun & Co. Stumpf, C. 1891/2017. Psychology and Epistemology. Trans. J. Leech and M. Textor. Manuscript. Originally Published as 'Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie' in Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 19(2): 465–516. Wesche, B. 1985. At Ease with 'At'. Journal of Semantics 5: 385–398. AQ12 AQ13 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 A u th o r P ro o f Author Query Form Book ID: 461216_1_En Chapter No: 6 Please ensure you fill out your response to the queries raised below and return this form along with your corrections. Dear Author, During the process of typesetting your chapter, the following queries have arisen. Please check your typeset proof carefully against the queries listed below and mark the necessary changes either directly on the proof/online grid or in the 'Author's response' area provided Query Refs. Details Required Author's Response AQ1 Please check the quote usage in the sentence 'Der Körper ist an dem ...'. AQ2 The citation 'Wesche (1986)' has been changed to 'Wesche (1985)' to match the author name in the reference list. Please check here and in subsequent occurrences, and correct if necessary. AQ3 Reference 'Marty (1990)' is cited in the text but not provided in the reference list. Please provide the respective reference in the list or delete this citation. AQ4 The citation 'Smith (1998)' has been changed to 'Smith (1990)' to match the author name in the reference list. Please check here and in subsequent occurrences, and correct if necessary. AQ5 Please check and update the citation 'Mulligan (1990)' refers to either 'Mulligan (1990a) or Mulligan (1990b)'. AQ6 The citation 'Moore (1922)' has been changed to 'Moore (1903)' to match the author name in the reference list. Please check here and in subsequent occurrences, and correct if necessary. AQ7 The citation 'Chalmers (2010)' has been changed to 'Chalmers (2006)' to match the author name in the reference list. Please check here and in subsequent occurrences, and correct if necessary. AQ8 Please check and confirm if the inserted publisher name and location are correct in reference 'Chisholm (1990)'. AQ9 Please check and confirm if the inserted publisher name and location are correct in reference 'Egidi (1990)'. A u th o r P ro o f Query Refs. Details Required Author's Response AQ10 Reference 'Marty (1908)' is given in the list but not cited in the text. Please cite in text or delete from the list. AQ11 Reference 'Marty (1916)' is given in the list but not cited in the text. Please cite in text or delete from the list. AQ12 Reference 'Strawson (1959/1961)' is given in the list but not cited in the text. Please cite in text or delete from the list. AQ13 Reference 'Stumpf (1891/2017)' is given in the list but not cited in the text. Please cite in text or delete from the list. A u th o r P ro o f MARKED PROOF Please correct and return this set Instruction to printer Leave unchanged under matter to remain through single character, rule or underline New matter followed by or or or or or or or or or and/or and/or e.g. e.g. under character over character new character new characters through all characters to be deleted through letter or through characters under matter to be changed under matter to be changed under matter to be changed under matter to be changed under matter to be changed Encircle matter to be changed (As above) (As above) (As above) (As above) (As above) (As above) (As above) (As above) linking characters through character or where required between characters or words affected through character or where required or indicated in the margin Delete Substitute character or substitute part of one or more word(s) Change to italics Change to capitals Change to small capitals Change to bold type Change to bold italic Change to lower case Change italic to upright type Change bold to non-bold type Insert 'superior' character Insert 'inferior' character Insert full stop Insert comma Insert single quotation marks Insert double quotation marks Insert hyphen Start new paragraph No new paragraph Transpose Close up Insert or substitute space between characters or words Reduce space between characters or words Insert in text the matter Textual mark Marginal mark Please use the proof correction marks shown below for all alterations and corrections. If you in dark ink and are made well within the page margins. wish to return your proof by fax you should ensure that all amendments are written clearly